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Harold K. Jacobson was a deeply democratic individual, in his own
personal style as well as in principle. He did not seem to have an authori-
tarian bone in his body. Jake was the epitome of reasonable persuasion,
eschewing the temptations of prestige and the perquisites of power. He
consistently sought to enhance understanding of issues so that public
policy could be improved.
It is not surprising, therefore, that at the time of his sudden and un-
timely death, Jake was working on what became Democratic
Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, co-edited with
Charlotte Ku. Throughout his life, Jake was interested in how interna-
tional institutions and law could prevent the use of force by states when
possible, coordinate effective responses to it, and when force was neces-
sary, use it in limited and responsible ways.
Most of the chapters in Democratic Accountability and the Use of
Force are devoted to description and analysis of national systems of
democratic accountability in nine countries that have historically been
important to United Nations peacekeeping and peace-enforcement ef-
forts. Ku and Jacobson also ask about the extent to which the procedures
and practices of the Security Council meet standards of democratic
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I. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2003).
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accountability. That is, they focus in part on the international dimensions
of the problem of accountability. However, they never define account-
ability-they do not elaborate what they mean by it, nor do they develop
a typology that would enable us to understand the multiple forms ac-
countability may take, both in contemporary democracies and in world
politics.
Instead, Ku and Jacobson begin with Robert A. Dahl's discussion of
the five criteria of a democratic polity: effective participation, voting
equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion
of adults.2 But as Ku and Jacobson clearly state in their conclusion, four
of these criteria (all but "enlightened understanding") "can only be met
at the national level."3 In other words, Dahl's criteria for democratic ac-
countability are largely irrelevant to international institutions and to
world politics. World politics is organized around states, which are not
equal. Furthermore, since states vary in size as well as in the quality of
their internal practices, there is little normative reason for treating them
as equals, despite the (non-democratic) tradition of sovereignty. Giving
equal votes to China and Cameroon would violate the principle of indi-
vidual equality so dear to democrats.
Dahl concludes that international organizations are "bureaucratic
bargaining systems," rather than democracies or proto-democracies.4 In
one sense, this conclusion is indisputable: international organizations
cannot meet the conditions of democratic accountability that are appro-
priate to the domestic level. But, it begs the key issues. Anyone who
understands international interdependence and globalization recognizes
that sustained cooperation in world politics requires international institu-
tions. Yet, international institutions will never be democratic, even on
the standards applicable to very large states. There is no coherent public
with a public space, individuals do not have sufficient incentives to pay
attention to policy issues at the level of international institutions, and
opportunities for participation by ordinary citizens are very limited.
Accountability can operate, however, without democracy.
Non-democratic institutions, such as well-functioning Weberian bureauc-
racies, hold officials accountable. So do courts, which are not inherently
democratic. In another way, markets hold firms and their leaders
accountable for performance, without meeting democratic criteria.
2. Id. at 10.
3. Id. at 368.
4. Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic's View,
in DEMOCRACY'S EDGES 19, 33-34 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999).
5. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (3d ed. 2001); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
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Practices of accountability, therefore, can be more or less democ-
ratic, depending on whether higher-level power wielders are held
accountable to larger groups of people who are individually less power-
ful. Systems that hold elites accountable to non-elites are, at least to
some extent, democratic. Systems that fail to hold elites accountable to
non-elites, even though they may hold lower-level officials accountable
to higher-level ones, or firms to markets, are not democratic.
My purpose in this article is to complement the argument of Ku and
Jacobson by theorizing accountability, and in particular, by invoking a
typology of accountability that is, unlike Dahl's analysis, relevant to in-
ternational institutions such as the United Nations Security Council.
Having developed my argument and my typology, I will reanalyze the
practices of the Security Council, as described by Ku and Jacobson, To
what extent could Security Council practices be improved to make its
members more accountable, even if strictly democratic accountability is
not feasible?
The best tribute I can pay to Harold K. Jacobson is to seek in this
way to extend and enrich his own analysis of accountability. Over the
more than thirty years of our friendship, I never saw Jake bristle at criti-
cism or become defensive. He always wanted to explain the past, in
order to deepen his own understanding. The last thing he expected or
desired was complacent acceptance of his own arguments as true and
complete. Engaging in constructive extensions of his work, even with its
implied criticism, seems to me a more fitting memorial to the Jake I
knew than simply to praise his scholarship.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss a pluralistic the-
ory of accountability. I begin by defining accountability in a standard
fashion, emphasizing two conditions: the availability of information to
accountability-holders, and their ability to sanction power-wielders. I
then proceed to discuss a pluralistic conception of accountability sys-
tems. Part II then develops a typology of eight accountability
mechanisms, all of which are found in democratic societies, but not all
of which are democratic per se. Part III builds on the Jacobson-Ku dis-
cussion of the current practices, relative to accountability, of the Security
Council and asks how they could, from the perspective of accountability,
be improved.
I. A PLURALISTIC THEORY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
There is wide agreement on how to define accountability. The con-
cept of accountability derives from Old French equivalents for comptes al
1123Summer 2003]
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rendre, meaning the rendering of accounts.6 Not surprisingly, standard
definitions of accountability emphasize both information and sanctions.
"Governments are 'accountable' if citizens can discern representative
from unrepresentative governments and can sanction them appropri-
ately."7 "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's
(past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer pun-
ishment in the case of eventual misconduct. '8 "To be accountable means
to have to answer for one's action or inaction, and depending on the an-
swer, to be exposed to potential sanctions, both positive and negative '"9
"The very essence of accountability" is that the "initiative must be held
by the questioners."' All satisfactory definitions of accountability in-
clude, explicitly or implicitly, two essential features: information and
sanctions.
Since accountability is a relational term, a person or organization has
to be accountable to someone else. It is therefore essential, in thinking
about accountability in a given situation, to distinguish between power-
wielders and the accountability holders to which they are held
accountable. Accountability is a matter of degree. For a relationship to
be one of accountability, there must be some provision for interrogation
and provision of information, and some means by which the accountabil-
ity-holder can impose costly sanctions on the power-wielder. But there is
no presumption that the accountability holder knows what information to
ask for, that all information desired by the accountability-holder will be
provided by the power-wielder, or that the accountability-holder's sanc-
tions will be effective in changing the power-wielder's behavior. In
addition, imposing sanctions is often costly to the accountability-holder
as well, tending to limit the extent to which they are employed.
6. Mel Dubnick, Clarifying Accountability: An Ethical Theory Framework, in PUBLIC
SECTOR ETHICS: FINDING AND IMPLEMENTING VALUES 68, 70 (Charles Sampford & Noel
Preston eds., 1998).
7. DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 10 (Adam Przeworski et al.
eds., 1999).
8. Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 17 (Andreas Schedler et al.
eds., 1999).
9. Ronald J. Oakerson, Governance Structures for Enhancing Accountability and
Responsiveness, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 114 (James L. Perry ed., 1989). In
most discussions of accountability, sanctions imply punishment rather than reward; but what
constitutes a punishment and what constitutes a reward depends on a baseline of prevailing
expectations, which may depend on evaluations of past performance. An exclusive emphasis
on punishment, ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 222, n.15
(2001), begs the question of how the baseline is established.
10. JOHN UHR, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA: THE CHANGING PLACE OF
PARLIAMENT 176 (1998) (summarizing Normanton's thesis on public accountability).
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A. Accountability as a Power Relationship
Accountability relationships are closely related to power relation-
ships. Since accountability requires some ability of accountability
holders to sanction power-wielders, a relationship of accountability can
only exist if the accountability holder can exercise some degree of influ-
ence over the power-wielder. This is a truism: a logical implication of
how I have defined accountability as a relationship. At the extreme point,
when nominal accountability-holders have no ability to punish decision-
makers, power-wielders will not have to explain their policies and will
not be accountable at all. Stalin was nominally an agent of the Supreme
Soviet, but the member of the Supreme Soviet who demanded account-
ability of Stalin would have had a short life expectancy. Clearly, power
relationships will affect whether a nominal accountability system is ef-
fective (that of the Soviet Union under Stalin's Constitution was not),
and the distributional gains and losses that ensue.
One feature of an accountability relationship is that actors demand-
ing influence do so by using normative language. Non-elites, and
competing elites, assert their rights to control the behavior of power-
wielders; and as we will see, different actors compete for access to
power-wielders. Cast in the language of power, an accountability rela-
tionship is a relationship in which an actor making a normative claim
that it should have influence over another actor actually has such influ-
ence; and in which the actor subject to influence has significant
discretion. Power relationships that are not accountability relationships
include direct supervision of a subordinate who does not exercise discre-
tion, and exercise of power without a normative claim that one has a
right to do so.
By my definition, almost all collectivities are accountable to some
extent, since almost all collectivities are subject to some form of influ-
ence from people making normative claims. The validity of such claims,
however, can be contested. From a normative standpoint, the relevant
question is whether the type and extent of the accountability relation-
ships is appropriate. Are the mechanisms of accountability that are
actually applied, the most effective ones with the least significant nega-
tive side effects? And is the right amount of accountability demanded of
power-wielders? In view of tradeoffs between accountability and effi-
ciency, it is possible to have too much accountability as well as too little.
B. Authorization and Contestation
An institutional analysis of accountability needs to examine not
only relationships of accountability per se, but also the politics of
Summer 2003] 1125
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authorization and reauthorization. Actions of authorization are actions
that create authority relationships.
Authorization refers to whether a rights-holder has given her right to
act to another person." A power-wielder can be authorized or unauthor-
ized to carry out certain actions; and we can know this by consulting
rules and procedures for authorization. An authorized power-wielder
may or may not be accountable. Hobbes's sovereign, for instance, is au-
thorized to act on behalf of a set of people, but is not accountable to
them. Complaints about lack of accountability often do not question that
certain power-wielders are authorized to act for others, but object that
those for whom they act have insufficient knowledge of their actions and
are not sufficiently able to sanction them.
Constitutional systems often authorize power-wielders to carry out
tasks for which they are deliberately not held accountable. It would be
inappropriate to regard the United States Supreme Court, while exercis-
ing constitutional review, as the agent of the public. When the Court
strikes down a legislative act, it is not acting as an agent, but as a trustee
of the public good, defending principles traditionally conceived of as
valid, even in the face of public hostility.
The authorization problem is how to establish institutions that main-
tain a sufficient degree of accountability, for the system as a whole,
without hobbling the ability of power-wielders to act on behalf of the
society, often in ways that require improvisation. Madison's institutional
solution to this problem is the most famous: to establish formal organiza-
tions in which "ambition [is] made to counter ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."'2
The endurance of the American Constitution, despite a plethora of op-
portunists and scoundrels in office from time to time, is testimony to the
success of this design.
In world politics, as well as in weakly institutionalized domestic re-
gimes, existing authorizations are typically fragile, and often contested.
The politics of competition for access becomes a continuing activity.
Who gets the ability to influence the power-wielder? In weakly institu-
tionalized systems, the struggle is ongoing, only temporarily resolved in
accordance with power relationships. Indeed, we can think of an au-
thorization-reauthorization cycle. After the authorization of a set of
accountability relationships, actors engaged in the process will evaluate
how those relationships are working from their standpoints. Actors that
perceive themselves as disadvantaged by these arrangements, and that
think they have sufficient political resources to alter or overturn them,
I1. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 43, 51 (1967).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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will devise strategies to do so. If successful, some form of reauthoriza-
tion will take place, and the cycle begins anew.
The politics of accountability in such systems is profoundly different
than in highly institutionalized systems. In constitutionalized systems,
the politics of accountability is highly institutionalized, with established
relationships. But in weakly institutionalized systems, the politics of ac-
countability is a struggle over what those relationships will be in the first
place, and is therefore much more fundamental.
C. Pluralistic Accountability Systems
In discussing the overall patterns of accountability within a govern-
ance structure, I will refer to the accountability system. The
accountability system is the set of accountability mechanisms, and their
interactions, that characterize a given governance system, from the rela-
tionship between the electorate (if any) to the highest political officials,
all the way to the relationship between a working-level bureau and its
clients. The notion of an accountability system has its roots in the de-
bates in the field of public administration running from Woodrow Wilson
to Herbert A. Simon.
The classic public administration view of accountability, pioneered
by Wilson in the 1880s, rested on the proposition that "the more power is
divided the more irresponsible it becomes."'3 According to this unitary
theory of public administration, unity of command down the hierarchy is
a necessary precondition for both efficiency and accountability. Unity of
command makes it possible to attribute responsibility for actions, and to
hold the responsible agents accountable.
In 1948, however, Herbert Simon showed that several principles of
the classic works of public administration were contradictory.'4 For in-
stance, the principle of unity of command contradicted the principle of
specialization. Unity of command would mean that specialized depart-
ments (e.g., of accounting) could not exercise authority over accounting
offices within other departments (e.g., a school), thus reducing the im-
pact of specialized expertise on the accounting practices of the school.
The so-called "principles" such as unity of command, specialization, and
limiting the span of control of administrators, are actually competing
criteria, which are in continual tension with one another in public ad-
ministration. Likewise, agencies and firms can organize themselves by
13. VINCENT OSTROM, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION 24 (1973) (summarizing the basic propositions of Woodrow Wilson's paradigm for
creating a science of administration).
14. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 20-26 (1976).
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purpose, process, clientele, or place, but not simultaneously. Choices
have to be made.
Simon's critique helped to foster what could be called a pluralistic
theory of administration. Such a model of administration involves dis-
persion rather than concentration of authority among units with
overlapping jurisdictions, whose conflicts over jurisdiction are subject to
judicial remedies. 5 This model takes into account the crosscutting nature
of issues, which implies the fragmentation of administrative jurisdic-
tions. Pluralistic theories of administration call for complex governance
structures, unlike the simple, unified centers of command and control
prescribed by orthodox administrative theory.
In this model,
[i]mplementing agencies, not 'the government,' are regarded as
the basic units of accountability. Vertical hierarchy is augmented
by multilateral arrangements in which implementing agencies
are subject to multiple constraints of different sorts, both politi-
cal (sometimes electoral) and legal. The links between
governance and administration are many.16
In a pluralistic model, accountability applies not only to hierarchical
superiors and electorates but also to specialized agencies within the lar-
ger organization, to courts, to distinct organizations with overlapping
areas of responsibility, and to a variety of constituencies, some of them
organized into nongovernmental interest groups. These accountability
relationships are likely often to conflict with one another, since the prin-
cipals have different interests, values and purposes.
The unitary theory of public administration ultimately rests on a uni-
tary theory of sovereignty, which was rejected by the founders of the
United States.'" Such a theory may be relevant for parliamentary sys-
tems, but does not describe practice in the United States, and certainly
does not remotely describe governance arrangements at the global level,
where sovereign authority is notably lacking. Hence, the pluralistic
15. OSTROM, supra note 13, at 89-92. Vincent Ostrom describes what I am calling a
pluralist theory as a theory of democratic administration, and traces it to Hamilton, Madison,
and Tocqueville. Such administration is open to broad participation by members of the com-
munity and their elected representatives, under the framework of law. As Tocqueville
commented, "a genuine hierarchy among officials" did not exist among American local offi-
cials, each elected to a different office for a fixed term; hence the judicial power was extended
into the electoral world. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 70 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000).
16. Oakerson, supra note 9, at 118.
17. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
201-29 (1967).
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theory of public administration is more relevant than the unitary one as a
basis for the analysis of systems of accountability.
The theory of pluralistic accountability has the further virtue that it
points to a further problem: that of collective responsibility. In a plural-
istic accountability system, there are many decision-makers, or core
groups, and it is difficult to identify responsibility for action and inac-
tion. Derek Bok eloquently indicts Congress for its lack of collective
responsibility:
Instead of being collectively responsible for the programs they
enact, members of Congress are individually accountable to their
constituents (and perhaps, in some degree, to their contributors)
.... [Individual] accountability ... does nothing to make
[members of Congress] collectively responsible for compiling a
strong record of bills that successfully accomplish important
public purposes. On the contrary, opening more of the work of
individual lawmakers to public scrutiny often exposes them all
the more to the centrifugal pressures of special interests and
constituent groups that make it so difficult to agree on well-
crafted, coherent legislation.1
8
Congress is divided by political parties and ideology; but it produces
outcomes as a collective entity. Networks are linked sets of actors (indi-
viduals and organizations) that do not necessarily share a common
organizational structure, but whose actions have results. The results of
foreign aid in developing countries, for instance, may be attributable
more to the whole network of relationships involving donors and recipi-
ents, than to any one set of actors.' 9
From the standpoint of external principals, the problem of account-
ability then becomes one of attribution of responsibility to members of
teams, or to participants in a collectivity or a network. In a liberal, indi-
vidualistic political system, individuals are the basic unit of analysis.
They are rewarded and punished, whether directly (as individuals) or
indirectly (as members of organizations). Responding to this problem of
attribution in the context of American governmental administration,
Eugene Bardach suggests peer accountability and greater involvement of
consumers or clients or customers as two ways to evaluate collaborative
activity.2° The basic point is that participants within the organization
must have both the required information and incentives to demand
18. DEREK BOK, THE TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT 131-(2001).
19. S.M. RAVi KANBUR ET AL., THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: COMMON
POOLS AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS (1999).
20. EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND
THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 144 (1998).
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accountability. Unlike outsiders, they can identify who is responsible for
results or for failures: they have information as a result of their organiza-
tional activity. Precisely because they are likely to suffer if their
organization does badly (insofar as accountability operates at the level of
the organization), they have incentives to help correct the problem at the
individual level.
Pluralistic accountability systems are messy. But, the nature of world
politics means that any accountability arrangements at the international
level will be pluralistic. And since they will not be highly institutional-
ized either, they will be particularly messy. Yet, the alternative is not
well-institutionalized democratic accountability, but little meaningful
accountability at all.
II. EIGHT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
We know that in complex systems, accountability will be highly im-
perfect. How, then, can we analyze the potential for accountability in a
complex system?
I proceed by seeking to identify the types of accountability that op-
erate within contemporary democracies. My criteria for identification
focus on the mechanisms used to sanction agents. Sanctions are central
to accountability, and mechanisms for sanctioning available to account-
ability holders are a key to the operation of accountability in a pluralistic
administrative system. Without mechanisms for sanctions, demands on
power-wielders for answers are unlikely to be very effective. Further-
more, these mechanisms differ institutionally, such that they may be
distinguished relatively clearly from one another."
There are eight different mechanisms for sanctioning identified in
Appendix 1. We can imagine situations in which each mechanism links
one agent with one principal, although many actual situations will be
much more complex. Appendix 1 provides a schematic view of the eight
types of accountability in their simple, pure forms: as Weberian ideal
types. For each type of accountability, it indicates the power-wielders
and accountability-holders, and the mechanisms that impose costs on
power-wielders. Appendix 1 also provides examples of situations associ-
ated with each type of accountability.
In discussing Appendix 1, it is important to note once again that not
all forms of accountability are intrinsically democratic. Accountability is
21. It is true that for each type of accountability, the principal also needs sufficient
information to be able to attribute responsibility to particular agents. But informational chan-
nels do not appear to be as distinct as modes of sanctioning. Thus, modes of sanctioning are
employed for the typology of accountability mechanisms.
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an essential aspect of democracy, but it exists, in some forms, in all po-
litical regimes. This article considers accountability in general, not the
specifically democratic variety.
Hierarchical accountability -is a characteristic of bureaucracies and
of virtually any large organization. Superiors can remove subordinates
from office, constrain their tasks and room for discretion, and adjust
their financial compensation. Hierarchical accountability, as I use the
term, applies to relationships within organizations.
Supervisory accountability refers to the practice of authorizing one
collectivity to act as the accountability holder with respect to specified
power-wielders. One prominent example of supervisory accountability is
the requirement in representative democracies that executives answer to
legislatures for their actions and inactions. Legislatures can change the
mandates of executive agencies, and can exercise fiscal control. Legisla-
tive accountability is particularly strong in parliamentary systems, where
only the legislature, not the chief executive, is directly elected. As Laver
and Shepsle state, "the essence of parliamentary democracy is the ac-
countability of the government (also called cabinet, executive, or
administration) to the legislature. 22 Supervisory accountability is also
exemplified by the operations of boards of directors of firms or boards of
trustees of universities, foundations, and other non-profit entities.
Electoral accountability is also a distinctively democratic form of
accountability. In democracies, electorates determine whether officials
secure their reelection. Since officials typically seek reelection or elec-
tion to a higher office, this potential sanction is regarded as a powerful
inducement for them to explain their actions to electorates and serve
their electorates' interests. In this conventional view, much of the activity
of elected officials takes place "in the shadow of elections," with the
awareness that potential opponents may publicize their actions, if these
seem likely to be unpopular with their electorates.23 On the other hand,
some recent work suggests that even in democracies, there is much less
retrospective electoral accountability than the conventional view sug-
gtS24gests.l
In a sense, this failure should not be surprising in light of democratic
theory. Theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill em-
phasized in the mid- 19th century the importance, for effective control of
government, of alert and involved citizens and of a habit of voluntary
22. Michael Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Government Accountability in Parliamentary
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 279.
23. See DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
24. See Josd Antonio Cheibub & Adam Przeworski, Democracy, Elections and Ac-
countability for Economic Outcomes, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 222-49.
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civil association. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that "[tihe inhabitant of
New England is attached to his township not so much because he was
born there as because he sees in that township a free and strong corpora-
tion that he is a part of and that is worth his trouble to seek to direct."25
Democracy, in Tocqueville's view, also relies on the existence of multi-
ple voluntary associations,26 linked to political associations in multiple
ways. In the words of John Stuart Mill, "the rights and interests of every
or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person is
himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them." 7
Fiscal accountability describes mechanisms through which funding
agencies can demand reports from, and ultimately sanction, agencies that
are recipients of funding. This form of accountability was fundamental
to the emergence of parliamentary power in England during the 17"' cen-
tury, and is central to the control exercised by Congress over the
executive branch in the United States. It is particularly important for in-
ternational organizations such as the United Nations and the World
Bank, which rely on government appropriations to fund substantial parts
of their activities.
Legal accountability refers to the requirement that agents abide by
formal rules and be prepared to justify their actions in those terms, in
courts or quasi-judicial arenas. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville ob-
served how important courts were for administration in the United
States." This tradition continues, and has only been reinforced in recent
years. The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, with its legal re-
quirements for "notice and comment" by agencies to the public, and for
judicial review, illustrates the operation of legal accountability."
Market accountability is a less familiar category, but an important
one. 0 It is important to emphasize that this form of accountability is not
to an abstract force called "the market," but to specific principals, whose
influence on their agent is exercised in whole or in part through markets,
and the information communicated through them. These principals in-
25. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 15, at 63-64.
26. See id. at 496-500.
27. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, in REP-
RESENTATION 177, 178 (Hannah Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1967).
28. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 15, at 70.
29. Matthew D. McNollgast et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Politi-
cal Control, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 243, 263 (1987); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 43-44 (1988); JERRY L. MASHAW,
GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 165
(1997).
30. Joseph S. Nye has emphasized the role of market accountability, and I am indebted
to him for my inclusion of this mechanism. See, e.g., MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY
SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds.,
2002).
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clude investors in equities and in bonds, whose actions may punish
firms, by reducing stock prices and access to capital in general. More
indirectly, they include consumers of products sold in markets. As Albert
0. Hirschman has pointed out, pressure on organizations from markets
typically takes the form more of "exit" than "voice."'" Investors and con-
sumers abandon the firm more often than they vote out its management
or demand changes in practices. Investors may also stop investing in
countries whose policies they dislike. Market accountability is more in-
direct than the five forms discussed above, since specific demands to
explain policies may not be a very important aspect of the process.
Nonetheless, markets provide a mechanism for sanctioning that can be
quite effective. The impact of financial markets on self-reporting is indi-
cated by the much greater volume of information that is available from
publicly held, than from privately held, firms.
Participatory accountability arises as the result of demands for ex-
planation of professional performance or bureaucratic action.
Professionals claim expertise, for which validation is required. The re-
sponse of professional societies and networks to demands from outsiders
for validation is typically some form of peer review. Hannah Arendt de-
scribed bureaucracy as "rule by Nobody." She declared that, "[i]f... we
identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account of itself,
rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one
left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done."32 One
response to this potential lack of accountability on the part of bureau-
cratic organizations is to devise arrangements that designate as principals
people who are within the organization, or who work closely enough
with it so that they can hold individuals responsible for their actions.
When participatory accountability operates, agents are answerable to
other people participating with them in a decision-making process. The
accountability holders in relationships of participatory accountability can
be coworkers, clients or professional peers. The key point about partici-
patory accountability is that the accountability holders work closely with
the authorized wielders of power and observe their behavior first hand;
they are not hierarchically superior to power-wielders. Participatory ac-
countability provides a potential link between collective and individual
accountability.
My final category is public reputational accountability. In a sense,
this category could be misleading. Isn't reputation involved in all the
other forms of accountability? Superiors, legislatures, electorates, courts,
31. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 40 (1970).
32. HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 137-38 (1969).
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fiscal watchdogs, markets, and-peers all take the reputations of power-
wielders into account. The category of public reputational accountability,
however, is meant to apply to situations in which reputation, widely and
publicly known, provides a mechanism for accountability even in the
absence of other mechanisms. For instance, the United States Supreme
Court is deliberately shielded from the other types of accountability. Its
members do not have to answer to Congress except in cases of alleged
severe malfeasance. They are not accountable to hierarchical superiors,
executive or judicial, nor to the electorate, since judges serve for life.
They face no fiscal constraints, since under the Constitution their salaries
cannot be reduced during their terms of office.33 Outsiders are not privy
to their deliberations, and they are not accountable to markets. Neverthe-
less, it could not properly be said that Supreme Court justices are
entirely unaccountable. They are expected not merely to make decisions
but to justify them in writing. Their opinions are minutely examined and
criticized by other justices, legal scholars, and members of the public.
The reputations of particular justices rise or fall depending on these
evaluations. For justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, a
devastating critique of an opinion may surely constitute a sanction.
These types of accountability are not mutually exclusive, but over-
lap. That is, a given process of accountability may involve several types.
For instance, when a legislature holds an executive agency accountable
for a set of regulatory decisions, it may do so through fiscl measures,
and the effect of its actions may be to alter the agency's reputation. In
their analysis of what they call "extended accountability" in east central
Europe after 1989, David Stark and Ldsl6 Bruszt analyze "the em-
beddedness of the decision-making center in networks of autonomous
political institutions that limit the arbitrariness of incumbents. 34 Incum-
bents continually have to negotiate with these institutions in order to
maintain sufficient credit to be effective. Madison, Tocqueville and Mill
would all recognize the process.
A priori, it is hard to make judgments about the effectiveness of
these eight types of accountability. Indeed, since they seem to work best
in combination, and embedded in appropriate institutions both of gov-
ernment and civil society, the question may be pointless. Even taken by
themselves, it appears that the degree of control associated with each
type of accountability can vary from very effective to very ineffective.
Hierarchical control, for instance, is not necessarily more effective than
reputational control. Indeed, those of us who work in universities have
33. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
34. DAVID STARK & LASL6 BRUSZT, POSTSOCIALIST PATHWAYS: TRANSFORMING POLI-
TICS AND PROPERTY IN EASTERN EUROPE 188 (1998).
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all experienced organizations whose nominal hierarchies are ineffective,
but in which reputation serves as a powerful incentive. Issues of effective
control involve difficult issues of influence, which require more sus-
tained discussion than simply to be asserted as aspects of typologies.35
Appendix 2 portrays the different transmission belts and catalysts
distinctive to each form of accountability. The transmission belts or ac-
countability mechanisms, which appear in the last column, define each
type of accountability, as noted above. For each set of transmission belts,
there are distinctive "catalysts," or signals that activate the accountability
mechanisms. Organizational hierarchies respond to performance evalua-
tions. Legislators and courts respond to "fire alarms"-protests and
demands from constituents about, and lawsuits over, the operation of a
bureaucracy. 6 Markets respond to shifts in profitability and market share.
Customers and clients may react through "exit" or "voice."37 The public
reacts based on how their leaders' performances match up to expecta-
tions. These catalysts are illustrative rather than comprehensive; the
point is that different mechanisms of accountability involve different
catalysts for action. In interpreting Appendix 2, however, one should not
forget that agents can often shape the institutional constraints-including
the catalysts and transmissions belts-within which they work.
III. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Jacobson and Ku criticize accountability in the Security Council on
several grounds. My purpose in this section is to reanalyze the issue of
the accountability of Security Council practices, using their description
35. See, MELVIN J. DUBNICK & BARBARA S. ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINI-
STRATION: POLITICS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS 76-83 (1991); Barbara S.
Romzek, Enhancing Accountability, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 97 (James L.
Perry ed., 2d ed. 1996). Melvin Dubnick and Barbara Romzek have devised a fourfold catego-
rization of accountability, which assumes that hierarchical accountability involves a higher
"degree of control" than what they call professional accountability (which encompasses as-
pects of participatory and reputational accountability), and legal accountability involves more
control than what they term political accountability (which encompasses electoral and legisla-
tive accountability). If they are only referring to nominal control-minuteness of
supervision-their statement seems to be correct. But if they imply that effectiveness varies in
this way, the inference is questionable. Indeed, they claim that where professionals are in-
volved in public administration, loose supervision will generally be more effective than close
supervision. Tocqueville's discussion questions the assumption that legal accountability im-
plies more effective control over elected officials than political accountability, except in cases
of malfeasance: "In reality, the elected magistrate has nothing to expect or to fear except from
the electors when all public offices are the product of election." TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 15,
at 70. The Dubnick-Romzek typology omits my categories of fiscal and market accountability.
36. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28
AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
37. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3 1, at 4.
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of actual practices but applying my typology, presented above, of ac-
countability mechanisms.
Jacobson and Ku point out that in a variety of ways, Security Coun-
cil practices do not meet standards of democratic accountability. The
Security Council fails on the standard of equitable representation, be-
cause its voting is based on the sovereign equality of states, Europe is
over-represented, and five states have the extraordinary privilege of the
veto. However, I have argued above that it would be unrealistic to expect
the Security Council to meet democratic standards. The more relevant
question is whether the Security Council meets pluralistic standards of
accountability.
Of the eight mechanisms I have outlined, three seem of little rele-
vance to the Security Council. The Security Council is not subject to
external legal constraints: the International Court of Justice does not re-
view the "constitutionality" of its acts. Nor is the Security Council
significantly accountable to financial markets, especially when compared
other international institutions such as the World Bank. And, of course,
there are no meaningful popular elections that enable voters to hold Se-
curity Council participants accountable.
The other five mechanisms, however, are all relevant. The Security
Council operates through instructions to the Secretary-General, and its
efficacy therefore depends on hierarchical accountability within the
United Nations system. If the Secretary-General does not control his
subordinates, Security Council authority is, in practice, weakened. Ja-
cobson and Ku point out two deficiencies in hierarchical accountability.
First, civilian control is weak in UN peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement operations. Indeed, the nine states considered in their study
"have never given up command of their forces" nominally assigned to
the United Nations.38 They comment, "When the UN asks individual
states or coalitions of states to undertake military actions, reporting ar-
rangements are generally extremely loose and the UN's ability to
influence implementation limited."39 Secondly, there is little tradition of
personal accountability within the UN bureaucracy. Citing the failure of
UNPROFOR to protect "safe areas" in Bosnia, and the lack of punish-
ment of responsible officials for this failure, Jacobson and Ku comment:
"As yet .... there is no such accountability within the UN, and establish-
ing responsibility in the way that it is established in democracies proved
impossible. 40
38. Ku & Jacobson, supra note 1, at 371.
39. Id. at 372.
40. Id.
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Supervisory accountability-by which the Security Council holds
the Secretary-General himself accountable-appears to be more effec-
tive. Secretaries-General serve for five-year terms, and their reelection is
subject to Security Council action, including the veto. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was not reelected for a second term, as a result of
the negative views of the United States.
The fiscal accountability of the Security Council is both formal and
informal. Formally, the General Assembly has the responsibility to ap-
prove the budget of the United Nations." Indeed, this is the only serious
way in which the Assembly can hold the Security Council accountable,
since the Assembly cannot make any recommendations about disputes
being considered by the Security Council,42 and the Council only has a
perfunctory responsibility to provide annual reports to the Assembly.43 In
practice, this constitutional division of authority means that the budget,
including budgets for actions authorized by the Security Council, is not
subject to the veto. Not surprisingly, permanent members of the Council
have not always been happy with their budgetary assessments, and have
on occasion sought, outside the Charter, to bring pressure to bear by
withholding contributions. The Soviet Union sought to hold the United
Nations accountable for its operations in the Congo in the early 1960s,
leading to the "Article 19 Crisis" in 1964-65 over its non-payment of
dues." The United States also engaged in a long struggle over its non-
payment of UN dues, as a result of Congressional actions beginning in
the mid- 1980s.
One might expect that the Security Council would be subject to par-
ticipatory accountability, as a result of pressure from other states. In
particular, it might be expected that countries contributing troops to UN
peacekeeping operations would have a substantial voice in how their
military forces were employed. However, Jacobson and Ku point out
that, in a formal sense at least, they do not have such a voice:
Article 32 of the Charter requires that parties to a dispute be rep-
resented (without vote) in the Security Council. Troop-
contributing countries do not have a similar privilege. Unless it
happens to be a UNSC member, a country that contributes forces
or financial resources to UN operations has no vote in deciding
how to use them. Among the countries in this study, this issue
has been of particular concern to Canada and India. In the late
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 1.
42. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
43. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
44. Robert Owen Keohane, Political Influence in the General Assembly, 557 INT'L
CONCILIATION 43 (1966).
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1990s, almost two-thirds of the military personnel involved in
operations under UN command came from countries that were
not members of the Security Council. They have no say in the
initial mandate and rules of engagement, nor are they present if
the Council modifies the mission in the course of a military op-
eration.
Participatory accountability need not be democratic in a strict sense.
Its absence from Security Council procedures is a striking indication of
the self-protective way in which the Permanent Members have guarded
their privileges.
Finally, the most important mechanism of accountability for a well-
functioning Security Council is public reputational accountability.
Public reputational accountability does not depend on institutionalized
channels. Even without those channels, if sufficient information is avail-
able, individuals, NGOs, and other governments can criticize the
reasoning and evidence of members of the Security Council, as commen-
tators on the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States can do.
However, in their most telling criticism of Security Council practices, Ku
and Jacobson point out that "the Security Council's proceedings are fre-
quently not transparent .... Lack of transparency confounds democratic
accountability by limiting possibilities for understanding the bases and
purposes of UN-authorized military operations. 46 Actually, lack of
transparency confounds not just democratic accountability, but any
meaningful accountability. This absence of accountability was especially
egregious in the case of the Rwanda operation, since before the killings
began, the Security Council "rebuffed and quietly buried Belgium's re-
quest to strengthen UNOMUR. 47
Ku and Jacobson observe that lack of transparency extends to the ac-
tions of individual states, authorized by the Security Council to take
action involving military force. Often, they say, reports to the Council on
such operations have been perfunctory.48 Hence, states performing mili-
tary action at the request of the Council are not held accountable for
their activities.
45. Ku & Jacobson, supra note 1, at 358-59.
46. Id. at 359-60.
47. Id. at 368.
48. Id. at 360.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Harold Jacobson was perceptive in choosing to focus on issues of
accountability. With Charlotte Ku and other collaborators, he produced a
valuable book exploring gaps in both national and international account-
ability with respect to the use of force.
The Jacobson-Ku findings are actually more significant than their
own argument suggests, since it is not merely the case that the Security
Council does not meet standards of democratic accountability. Cynical
observers of world politics could all easily respond that "of course world
politics does not meet democratic standards." But a more thorough
analysis of accountability, as carried out in Parts I and II of this Article,
demonstrates that accountability is not merely a democratic concept.
There is a broader, pluralistic theory of accountability that applies to a
variety of non-totalitarian but not perfectly democratic states, and that is
also relevant to world politics.
Even under these pluralistic rather than democratic standards, the
United Nations Security Council displays a low level of accountability.
Ku and Jacobson are right to be critical. Many realistic improvements
may be instituted, even without assuming a transformation in the struc-
ture of world politics making legal or electoral accountability relevant to
the Security Council. Hierarchical accountability may be strengthened,
giving the Secretary-General more authority over his staff, and thereby
reducing his ability to evade accountability himself for the actions of his
staff. Participatory accountability may be improved by enabling states
participating in Security Council military actions, and financing them, to
have more information and a greater voice in their proceedings. Finally,
and most important, increasing the transparency of Security Council
processes would enhance the potential for public reputational account-
ability. Weak as it may be, increasing such accountability would enhance
the prospects for publicizing inaction before it is too late, and for prob-
ing the motives for action by the Council. By understanding and
explicating the various mechanisms by which pluralistic accountability
may work, scholars can expand their imaginations, and suggest practical
ways for the Security Council to become a more effective trustee for the
interests of the people of the world.
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